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Abstract
We present  experimental  results  from a  series  of  sessions  organized  using  the  Power 
Market simulator;  a  software  designed  to  realistically  replicate  the  Spanish  Electricity 
Market.  In the experiments reported here we compare the  status quo to two alternative 
treatments which represent alternative market structures. In one of them, labeled as vertical 
separation,  we  assume  that  power  generating  firms  and  electricity  distributors-end-
suppliers belong to separate business groups. In the second, we study the effect of entry by 
independent end-suppliers. Both alternative scenarios dominate the status quo in terms of 
market efficiency, whereas the latter of them dominates the former. 
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Introduction
The organization of the electricity market in Spain was transformed by 
the  Royal  Decree  54/1997.  This  law liberalized  the  market  for  electricity 
generation  and  introduced  a  spot  market  for  electricity  which  started 
operations in January 1998.1 Until 1996 there was no effective market to trade 
electricity and five companies possessed all the generation power, controlled 
transmission networks, and local distribution grids.2 Since the early nineties 
demand has been rising above GDP increases. Furthermore, the requirements 
by the European Community  to create and improve an effective electricity 
market  in  each  member  state  forced  the  government  to  design  a  more 
competitive scenario for the electricity sector in Spain.
However,  despite  this  liberalization  process,  there  is  still  a  high 
concentration in both the generation and distribution sectors. Besides, larger 
generators are also buyers in the pool. As a result, Spain’s large electricity 
companies  are  active  on  both  sides  of  the  electricity  spot  market,  selling 
electricity  as  generators  and  buying  it  from  the  spot  market  as  retailers. 
Together with an inelastic demand, these features suggest that firms will use 
their market power to set prices above costs, We argue that the status quo in 
the  Spanish  electricity  market  (SEM,  hereafter)  is  a  vertically  integrated 
structure, so that firms may exert an effective market power.
The main objective of the present study is to compare the  status quo 
industry structure of the SEM described above with two alternative structures. 
One of the alternative structures involves entry by independent firms into the 
distribution  sector.  The  other  structure  is  the  result  of  vertical  separation 
between producers and distributors. Comparisons will be performed using the 
experimental data obtained from three implementations of the  PM software 
1 This followed liberalization in the UK electricity market and was implemented simultaneoously with 
liberalization in Carlifornia.
2 Two firms, Endesa (EN) and Iberdrola (IB) owned more than 70 percent of the total generation capacity.
corresponding to three alternative treatments:  T1 (status quo),  T2 (Vertical 
Separation) and T3 (Independent Entry). Our aim is to study the effects of 
vertical  separation  and independent  entry  not  only  on  the  market  clearing 
price,  but  also  on  the  following  aspects  of  the  market  which  have  been 
neglected in all previous work so far:
• The ability of the sector to deal with demand- and supply-specific 
uncertainty  with  special  emphasis  to  daily  and  seasonal 
variations. 
and
• The  frequency  with  which  unfavorable  demand  or  supply 
conditions lead to the interruption of electric energy provision. 
Our results are interesting for similar regulatory measures implemented 
in  an  increasing  number  of  countries  aiming  at  a  more  competitive  price 
formation mechanism.  
Recently, several authors have studied the implications of the current 
conduct and performance of firms involved in the production and distribution 
of electric energy in Spain. Most of them warn us on the possibility that the 
market clearing mechanism used to determine electricity prices may facilitate 
collusion.3 A somehow different approach is used by Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-
Hita (2005, 2006), to reach a similar conclusion, according to which collusive 
outcomes are  favored by  the  way in  which firms  submit  their  bids  to  the 
market. 
In this paper, we explore a different way of improving the efficiency of 
the  electric  market  in  Spain,  focusing  on  structural  changes  rather  than 
studying  collusion-facilitating  aspects  of  firms’  conduct.  We  propose  and 
3 See for example the work by Fabra and co-authors (Fabra, 2003; Fabra et al., 2002; Fabra and Toro, 2006, 
Fabra  et  al.,  2006),  arguing that  the auction used to clear  the market  may be responsible  for  the firms’ 
increased ability to sustain prices which exceed those that would be in place if a more competitive mechanism 
were adopted.   
study two alternative market structures in comparison to the  status quo. The 
first  of  them  concerns  the  result  of  breaking  the  vertical  links  between 
producers and distributors of electric energy. A similar suggestion emerges 
from the  analysis  by  Gutiérrez-Hita  (2006),  although his  approach  is  very 
different to ours. A second structural change proposed here is the result of 
entry by independent firms in the distribution of electric energy. Given the 
dynamic  and  complex  nature  of  the  market,  none  of  these  two  types  of 
changes is expected to cause results which can be trivially predictable from 
textbook Industrial Organization. Furthermore in all the studies mentioned so 
far, some important features of the industry have been systematically ignored. 
This  has  been  the  case,  for  example,  with  demand  and  supply  dynamics, 
uncertainty due to weather and other external conditions, and asymmetries in 
firms’ production plant configurations. For obvious methodological reasons, 
the  resulting  complexity  regarding  the  combination  of  the  aforementioned 
factors  with  the  market  clearing  mechanism  is  also  an  underinvestigated 
question.  Needless  to  say  that  none  of  the  numerous  recent  studies  on 
electricity  markets  has  taken  into  account  these  important  aspects  in  their 
recommendations  for  economic  policy  and  (de)regulation.  Furthermore, 
supplier  asymmetries  and  vertical  relations  between  producers  and 
distributors, respectively selling to and buying from a pool are also neglected, 
although central to the case of an Electric network. 
Without underestimating what can be understood on real world markets 
from abstract  setups  of  reduced  complexity,  we claim that  the  experiment 
whose results  are  reported here accounts  for important  but  greatly  ignored 
details which are central in the case of an electricity market. Among them, 
daily and seasonal fluctuations affecting the demand and supply conditions 
seem to be the most important. 
It should be noted that laboratory data have been broadly used to study 
resource  and  energy  markets.  However,  most  theoretical  and  experimental 
approaches have adopted simple abstract environments. In this paper we argue 
that if complexity, uncertainty and dynamic considerations are important for 
the functioning of such markets, our experimental design brings us as close as 
one  can  get  to  the  market  under  study  without  the  usual  simplifying 
assumptions  (symmetry,  analytical  tractability,  etc.)  which  may  not  be  as 
innocuous  as  is  usually  claimed  or  wished.  Thus,  apart  from  using  the 
laboratory to address questions which are specific to this type of markets, an 
important novel feature of our approach is the realism of the software used to 
simulate the industry under study. With this, we do not argue that modelling 
real world markets though simpler abstract settings is not a useful strategy, but 
here  we propose an alternative approach,  allowing us to  get  closer  to real 
world case under study at a reasonably low cost. 
 The  Experimental  Economics  Laboratories  of  Valencia  (LINEEX, 
http://www.uv.es/lineex) and Castellón (LEE, http://www.lee.uji.es) possess a 
unique  experimental  environment  which  was  constructed,  following 
engineering  advice,  to  simulate  the  exact  supply  and  demand  conditions 
(including weather variations and daily and/or seasonal demand fluctuations) 
experienced by the producers and distributors of electric energy in Spain. At 
the same time, experimental subjects’ interface has been developed in a way 
which  reflects  the  productive  structures,  technological  specifications, 
capacities and restrictions of each one of the producers of electric energy in 
Spain.  The  result  of  this  effort  has  been  materialized  in  the  experimental 
software PM which is joint intellectual property of the two laboratories. The 
market-clearing  mechanism  implemented  reproduces  all  the  details  of  the 
auction adopted in the Spanish electricity pool.
A first set of sessions was run confirming the experimental subjects’ 
ability  to  learn  and  behave  in  an  economically  meaningful  way,  which 
reproduces  the  current  situation  of  the  market.  Daily  demand  fluctuations 
produce  prices  which follow the  usual  pattern:  “Extreme Peak”  prices  are 
higher  than  “Peak”  prices,  the  latter  are  higher  than  “Semi-valley”  prices 
which are higher than “Valley” prices.  
As mentioned above, in the study conducted here we aim at studying 
two alternative scenarios concerning the future of the industry.  In the first 
alternative scenario (Treatment 2), we implement a market structure in which 
producers  and  distributors  of  electric  energy  are  (vertically)  independent 
entities. In the second alternative scenario (Treatment 3), we consider a more 
competitive  distribution  with  a  number  of  small  but  independent  firms 
entering the downstream (distribution) market. Results from both alternative 
treatments will be compared to the benchmark case (Tretament 1) representing 
the status quo of the sector. 
Hopefully, our results will contribute to fill the gap between theoretical 
results  based mainly  on simple,  abstract,  symmetric  setups  and a  complex 
reality  with  asymmetric  producers  and  distributors  facing  a  complex  and 
uncertain economic system. 
 2. Methodology and Experimental Design 
The experiment proposed here is based on a three-treatment design. The 
first  treatment  (T1)  is  based  on  sessions  which  implement  an  industry 
structure  which  closely  replicates  the  current  status  of  the  SEM. The  two 
alternative treatments are inspired on the recommendations by several authors 
favoring either vertical separation of between producers and distributors (T2) 
or independent entry (T3) in the distribution market. In fact, the two scenarios 
have  never  been  compared  to  each  other  so  far.  Furthermore,  from  a 
methodological point of view, it has been impossible so far to study these two 
alternatives in the presence of all the complexity governing the demand and 
supply conditions of the SEM.
In all our treatments we captured the essence of the market dynamics by 
focusing on the four common price auctions that generate power prices in 
Spain. Our main scope was to analyze the introduction of competition in the 
auction to analyze its effect on market prices. For this reason, while offers 
(bids) producers (sellers) were chosen by human subjects, the technological 
side of production was simulated in our servers using data coming from actual 
Spanish firms and final  demand conditions were also simulated using data 
from the Spanish power market. 
We ran three different treatments; every treatment simulated a different 
market condition. In the first one, every market included ten firms. Half of 
them sell electric power to the market,  whereas the remaining five distribute 
power to final consumers.  
Table  1  summarizes  the  main  features  of  the  other  two  treatments 
relative to our baseline:
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
# of producers 5 5 5
# of sellers 5 5 7
Vertical teams Yes No Yes
# of markets 5 5 5
# of sessions 1 1 1
Table 1. Experimental Design
The  main  differences  between  treatments  are  the  following.  In  the 
baseline condition (Treatment 1), all participants participated in teams made 
up of one producer and one seller. Earnings were equally divided among each 
team’s members at the end of the experiment.  In the other two experimental 
treatments,  competition  was  introduced  by  breaking  the  vertical  linkages 
between  firms  (in  Treatment  2  subjects  were  paid  on  a  purely  individual 
basis), and increasing the number of independent sellers in the market (from 5 
to 7 in Treatment 3).
We used a between-subject design, as each participant faced only one 
environment and one condition. Participants were assigned to one market side 
at random and played a finitely repeated (32 rounds) game with fixed roles. 
Rounds reproduced the seasonal conditions of demand and production by a 
sequence of seasons. 
Sessions were run at the LINEEX computer lab of the University of 
Valencia. We aimed to gather data from fifty (sixty in treatment 3) firms for 
each treatment, grouped in five markets. Every treatment was run in a single 
session as the number of available computers in LINEEX’s main room is 64. 
The number of firms varies across treatments due to the experimental design.
Subjects were recruited among the graduate and undergraduate student 
population of the University of Valencia and the graduate population at the 
Technical  University  of  Valencia.  In  the  former,  we  recruited  among 
economics  and business  graduate  and undergraduate  students  with  at  least 
intermediate knowledge of industrial organization. In the latter, only graduate 
students from the School of Industrial Engineers were allowed to participate 
in the experiment. 
The  recruitment  procedures  were  the  standard  ones  in  Valencia. 
Students received an e-mail message announcing sessions. They then had to 
physically sign themselves in on a bulletin board. Subjects were only allowed 
to participate in a single session. 
At  the  beginning  of  each  session  the  experimenter  read  aloud  the 
instructions and subjects asked as many questions as they wish. All questions 
were answered publicly by the experimenter.  Before beginning to play, all 
subjects were asked to complete a short quiz about the payoffs and the rules of 
the experiment.  The full text for the instructions and quiz are available from 
authors upon request.
Rather than using abstract terminology we employ a rather naturalistic 
corporate  context.   For  example,  firms  were  explicitly  referred  to  as 
“producers” and “sellers”. They were told to conduct a “firm” (or being part 
of a holding of firms in Treatment 2). We avoided the use of terms with what 
we considered strong connotations.  For example, when being part of a team, 
subjects were not asked to cooperate (or fight) between them.  They had no 
information about the rest of the treatments run in the experiment and we did 
our best to minimize contamination between subjects participating in different 
sessions,  although  we  believe  that  this  was  not  a  major  issue  due  to  the 
complexity of our design. 
The instructions stressed their individual roles in the experiment. As it 
can be seen in the instructions, the meaning of bids and offers was carefully 
explained  to  them,  as  well  as  the  relevance  of  seasonality  and production 
technologies.   For experimenters who are used to worrying about repeated 
game effects, the use of fixed groups may seem like a strange design choice. 
However,  the  field  settings  that  we  are  interested  in  simulating  involve 
repeated  interactions  among  the  same  agents.  Repeated  game  effects  and 
history dependence are presumably quite natural in these settings.
Subjects knew in advance that there would be a total of 32 rounds and 
that  the  demand  condition  would  change  depending  on  seasonal  market 
conditions. The cost of a power supply interruption was also kwon in advance. 
In each round all participants had to simultaneously submit their bids 
and  offers  for  electric  power.  The  screen  on  which  subjects  made  their 
decisions  displayed  information  about  production  costs  (final  demand)  for 
producers (distributors).  The PM software was developed from scratch using 
Java language. Figures 10, 11 and 12 are screenshots from this software. Both 
figures show the complex information available to subjects before and after 
they made their decisions and the intensity of their efforts doing their job.
Once  their  bids  and  offers  were  submitted,  the  software  computed 
demand and supply functions and the four market prices. Firm’s payoffs were 
computed according to each firm buyer (seller) constraints. Figure 12 shows a 
sample output.
Separate  windows on the  feedback  screen  showed firms’  results  for 
each market at the aggregate level. In all rounds subjects had full information 
about their own costs and profits, and market prices coming from each of the 
four common price auctions. Information about the profit  level of all other 
participants remained unknown to them. Moreover, they had no information 
about other markets' performance in the same session.  
At the end of the session, each subject was paid in cash for all rounds 
played  plus  a  show-up  fee  of  five  euros.   Payments  took  place  on  an 
individual  and  private  basis.  Recall  that  all  payoffs  are  in  "ECUs" 
(experimental currency units) which were converted to euros.  The average 
total payoff was 95.29 € and the average session lasted about 150 minutes 
(another 60 minutes were used to explain the instructions and run the quiz). 
These earnings were sufficiently large to generate a good supply of subjects.
3. Results
In this section, we present the results obtained from 17 experimental 
markets: 6 under T1, 6 under T2 and 5 under T1. The discussion is based on 
the evolution of period averages of prices over 32 periods, plotted in Figures 
2-8 and the number of supply interruption decisions in Figure 9.  The first 
three  of  them are  constructed  to  compare  prices  across  the  four  different 
phases  of  demand during  a  day  within  each one  of  the  treatments.  These 
comparisons can be seen as a test of consistency for our experimental results, 
given that the price of electric energy in the “Valley” should be expected to be 
lower than the price in a “Semi-valley”, which in its turn should be lower than 
the price on the “Peak” and this, lower than the price on the “Extreme Peak”. 
FIGURE 2: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases in Treatment 1 
(mpv1: Average price for “Valley”, mps1: Average price for “Semi-Valley”, mpp1: 
Average Price for “Peak”, mpx1: Average Price for “Extreme Peak”).
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FIGURE 3: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases in Treatment 2 
(mpv2: Average price for “Valley”, mps2: Average price for “Semi-Valley”, mpp2: 
Average Price for “Peak”, mpx2: Average Price for “Extreme Peak”).
FIGURE 4: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases in Treatment 3 
(mpv3: Average price for “Valley”, mps3: Average price for “Semi-Valley”, mpp3: 
Average Price for “Peak”, mpx3: Average Price for “Extreme Peak”).
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TABLE 2: Average prices by treatment and hour
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
T1 T1-
stage
T2 T2-
stage
T3 T3-stage
pv 339.8
(51.3)
252.4
(39.5)
311.6
(51.4)
311
(58.3)
311.4
(57)
283.8
(31.7)
ps 353
(48.8)
291.4
(36)
353.9
(39.2)
351.7
(34.4)
334.2
(59.1)
325.9
(39.7)
pp 366
(57.4)
333.4
(25.9)
361.5
(37.5)
359.2
(33)
341
(63.5)
349.7
(33)
pep 397
(44.3)
341.4
(18.3)
386.2
(44.5)
394.6
(44.6)
369.5
(68.8)
375.3
(37.4)
Table  2 reports  the  average prices  by treatment  and hour.  From the 
table, we see that on average, valley prices are the highest under treatment 1. 
There are not  mean differences between semivalley and peak prices  under 
treatments 1 and 2. Thus, introducing upstream-downstream competition does 
not seem to be the most efficient way of enhance competition. Results are 
changed when more independent  distributors  are allowed to operate in the 
market.  Introducing upstream-downstream has a procompetitive effect  only 
during valleys, whereas the entry of more independent distributors guarantees 
lower prices also during semivalleys, peaks and extreme peaks.
Generally speaking, both our working hypotheses receive some support 
by our data, as can be seen in each one of the Figures 2-4. However, if we 
concentrate on the differences between “Semi-Valley” and “Peak” prices, we 
see that the aforementioned general picture becomes less clear and the inverse 
ranking than that implied by our hypotheses is obtained in some cases. On the 
contrary, “Extreme Peak” and “Valley” prices are clearly the highest and the 
lowest  in  all  periods  of  the  experiment  in  all  treatments,  which  implies  a 
strong  confirmation  of  the  hypothesis  that  our  design  yields  meaningful 
responses to the implemented daily fluctuations of demand. 
Let us look now at graphs 5-8. On them, comparison of price averages 
across treatments provides a first approach to the main conclusions of this 
paper.    
FIGURE 5: Evolution of “Valley” price averages for the three treatments (mpv1: 
Average price for “Valley” in treatment 1, mpv2: Average price for “Valley” in 
treatment 2, mpv3: Average price for “Valley” in treatment 3).
Figure 5 indicates that  both vertical  separation (T2) and independent 
entry  (T3)  in  the  market  for  electric  energy  distribution  would  reduce  the 
prices of electricity as compared to the status quo (T1).
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FIGURE 6: Evolution of “Semi-Valley” price averages for the three treatments 
(mps1: Average price for “Semi-Valley” in treatment 1, mps2: Average price for 
“Semi-Valley” in treatment 2, mps3: Average price for “Semi-Valley” in treatment 3).
FIGURE 7: Evolution of “Peak” price averages for the three treatments (mpp1: 
Average price for “Peak” in treatment 1, mpp2: Average price for “Peak” in 
treatment 2, mpp3: Average price for “Peak” in treatment 3).
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Regarding the prices of the “Semi-Valley” phase, Figure 6 suggests that 
the two alternative market structures studied here have a moderate effect on 
prices as compared to the baseline treatment (T1). More specifically, only the 
independent entry alternative seems to have a clear effect on prices, which are 
in this case systematically, although moderately, lower than in the other two 
treatments. On the contrary, vertical separation is not found to have any clear 
competition-enhancing effect on the prices of this demand phase.
Figure 7 indicates a similar pattern for “Peak” prices. Independent entry 
in the distribution of electric energy lowers prices, but less than in the case of 
what was found in the case of the “Semi-Valley” phase. Like in the previous 
case, vertical separation leads to prices which are not significantly different 
from those obtained in the baseline treatment for the same demand phase.
FIGURE 8: Evolution of “Extreme Peak” price averages for the three treatments 
(mpx1: Average price for “Extreme Peak” in treatment 1, mpx2: Average price for 
“Extreme Peak” in treatment 2, mpx3: Average price for “Extreme Peak” in 
treatment 3).
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Therefore, our results indicate that both structural changes considered 
here would lead to lower prices for electric  energy.  However,  independent 
entry  into  the  market  of  electric  energy  distribution  is  found  to  be 
systematically more effective than vertical separation in lowering prices. 
Another interesting feature of our results concerns an aspect which has not 
been  studied  so  far,  but  constitutes  a  central  concern  of  policy  makers 
regarding the function of the market  for electric energy.  The data contains 
information  on  seasonality,  hydroelectruic  resources,  temperature  and 
availability of new technologies. The effects of these variables on prices is 
tested.
If the weather is dry, hydroelectric generation cannot be used to cover 
baseload demand because the opportunity cost of water useage is very high. 
Therefore, generation comes from fossil fuels, which have a higher variable 
cost.  Table  3  computes  average  prices  under  the  different  treatments 
depending on water reserves and for the four different types of hours. 
Table 4 presents the results under three different scenarios of weather 
forecast. Interestingly, cold waves are more price rocketing than heat waves. 
The shape of the demand curve may be the reason of this behavior. We may 
observe more electricity is consumed during cold waves (heating) than during 
heat waves (cooling). Once again learning makes a difference during extreme 
peak hours under treatment 2 and cold waves.
Table 5 summarizes the results by season, treatment and time of the 
day, showing that, generally speaking, the aforementioned results concerning 
treatment  effects  are  robust  to  demand and supply  effects  of  the  seasonal 
variations implemented here.
TABLE 3: Average prices by water reserves, treatment and hour
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
T1 T1-
stage
T2 T2-
stage
T3 T3-
stage
Dry pv 342.6
(48.9)
255.7
(39.5)
315.5
(50.8)
311.8
(59.3)
321.4
(59.1)
285.9
(33.8)
ps 359.8
(45.9)
297
(35.4)
360.6
(36.2)
352.4
(35.5)
347.6
(62)
326.9
(40.8)
pp 369.7
(58.8)
334.8
(26.5)
369.3
(35.1)
357.6
(35.3)
353.5
(70.5)
350.7
(33.4)
pep 402.8
(41.4)
343.4
(16)
393.4
(47.2)
396.3
(49.4)
386.3
(73.9)
376.2
(39)
Humid pv 335.2
(55.1)
245.3
(39.5)
305
(52.1)
309.6
(57.1)
295.5
(49.6)
280.4
(28)
ps 341.5
(51.6)
278.9
(35.2)
342.7
(41.6)
350.6
(33)
312.8
(47)
324.2
(38.1)
pp 359.8
(54.8)
330.4
(24.9)
348.5
(38)
361.7
(29.1)
321
(44)
348.1
(32.7)
pep 387.1
(47.4)
337.1
(22.5)
374
(36.8)
391.9
(35.9)
342.7
(49.4)
373.8
(34.9)
TABLE 4 Average prices by temperature, treatment and hour
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
T1 T1-
stage
T2 T2-
stage
T3 T3-
stage
Normal pv 339.1
(52.1)
250.9
(39.4)
310
(51.5)
310
(58.3)
309.7
(55.2)
282.9
(31.4)
ps 351.8
(49.1)
289.5
(35.6)
352.8
(39.1)
351.5
(34.7)
330.3
(53)
325.4
(39.5)
pp 364.4
(57.1)
332.9
(25.8)
359.4
(36.2)
358.6
(33.7)
337
(57.9)
348.7
(31.9)
pep 395.3
(43.6)
339.9
(17.4)
384.6
(42.7)
393.3
(43.8)
364.4
(61.9)
374.6
(36.8)
Heat
Wave
pv 339.3
(51)
251.4
(49.1)
312.2
(49.7)
311
(70.1)
298.5
(39.7)
282
(33)
ps 360.2
(49.2)
297.5
(38.6)
360.5
(31.5)
348.4
(41)
334.6
(38.5)
327.3
(44.7)
pp 367.2
(54.8)
335
(31.1)
373
(28.3)
358
(30)
336
(49.2)
349
(33.6)
pep 395.7
(34.5)
346.2
(7.5)
384.5
(46)
384.9
(36.1)
362.3
(40.8)
374.3
(35)
Cold
Wave
pv 350.8
(42.8)
274.5
(35.4)
332.5
(52.8)
322.9
(54.5)
348
(83)
298.1
(35.5)
ps 361.5
(47.7)
311.5
(43)
362.5
(48.9)
357
(28.7)
386.3
(115.2)
331.6
(42.9)
pp 388
(65.5)
340
(28.3)
380
(57)
367
(28.2)
401
(111.6)
364.9
(47.8)
pep 421.6
(57.3)
358.8
(31.2)
409
(63.7)
420.4
(56.7)
446
(123.6)
385.4
(50.2)
TABLE 5 Average prices by season, treatment and hour
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
T1 T1-stage T2 T2-stage T3 T3-stage
Winter pv 345.5(45.2) 260.2(32.4) 319.5(55.9) 315.7(52) 339.1(69.6) 296.5(31.5)
ps 358.6(45.5) 291.9(35.6) 364.1(45) 354.7(30.2) 361.7(87.4) 328.9(38.8)
pp 379.2/64.1) 341.1(29.8) 371.4(43.1) 364.6(33) 379.6(89.5) 358.2(38.6)
pep 409.9(55.4) 341.9(24.4) 404.7(52) 418.4(58.4) 412.9(101) 384.5(48.3)
Autumn pv 343.8(53.8) 248.2(42.2) 309.4(44.1) 312.8(65.2) 313.6(47.9) 279.7(30.7)
ps 359.2(48) 295.3(38.8) 356(34.9) 356.1(35.1) 333.4(38.7) 325.5(40.5)
pp 362.6(56.2) 329(21) 362.5(34.7) 355.6(30.4) 334.9(44.2) 345.4(29.2)
pep 398.1(36.1) 345.1(6.4) 381.4(37.7) 379.8(32.3) 366.3(55) 368.5(31.4)
Spring pv 333.5(57.3) 252.9(40.4) 305(55.1) 306.1(54) 292.6(46.3) 278.9(31.4)
ps 337.9(49.3) 286.2(35.9) 343.1(43) 349.3(34.6) 314.8(44.9) 322.4(38.5)
pp 358.5(49.7) 330.7(25.9) 348.3(40) 362.1(32) 323.7(47) 346.6(31.8)
pep 387.5(46.7) 335(24.3) 375.1(39.3) 392.5(36.5) 343.8(40.8) 374.6(34.6)
Summer pv 336.4(49) 248.4(44.7) 312.3(50.6) 308.8(64.4) 300.6(50.6) 280.2(31.2)
ps 356.2(50.7) 292.2(36.7) 352.5(30.5) 346.4(38.9) 326.8(40.6) 326.7(42.5)
pp 363.7(58.5) 332.9(26.9) 363.9(28.1) 353.5(36.6) 325.2(43.9) 348.6(31.8)
pep 392.4(33.9) 344.8(9.7) 383.4(43.6) 384.5(34.4) 354.7(38.1) 373.4(32.7)
Finally, in Figure 9, we can observe a phenomenon which has not been 
reported so far.  Note that the entry of new firms in the market for electric 
market distribution increases the incentives of both downstream and upstream 
agents  to  use  supply  interruptions  as  a  strategic  weapon  signaling  their 
bargaining strength. However, interestingly, the vertical separation treatment 
(in which producers and distributors of  electricity are independent from each 
other) yields the lowest number of supply interruptions, which indicates that it 
is  the  presence  of  vertical  relations  among  incumbents  that  triggers  the 
“interruption wars” reported here.
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FIGURE 9: Total number of electric energy supply interruptions per treatment. 
4. Econometric Results
We can now test  several  hypotheses on the effects of the treatments 
under different scenarios on valley, semivalley, peak and extreme-peak prices. 
We have bidders that have been working under a vertically-integrated market 
structure,  individuals that bid under a vertically-separated market  structure, 
and new entrants on the demand side of the market. Therefore, we have three 
different  groups,  which  are  affected  by  several  exogenous  characteristics 
summarized in Section 3.
We build binary dummay variables to account for discrete shifts of the 
prices and quantities under differences in exogenous conditions. We estimate 
models of the form:
iiiiiiiii coldwaveheatwavedryhumidspringautumnerwp εδδδδδδδµ ++++++++= 7654321 int
and
iiiiiiiii coldwaveheatwavedryhumidspringautumnerwq εδδδδδδδµ ++++++++= 7654321 int
where pi denotes price at type of hour i and qi denotes quantity at type of hour 
i, where i is valley, semi-valley, peak and extrreme peak. The dummies have 
the following interpretation; autumni indicates whether or not the observation 
corresponds  to  that  season,  then  it  holds  that,  the  expected  price  when 
autumni=1 is,
[ ]
[ ] µ
δµ
==
+==
0|
1| 2
ii
ii
autumnpE
autumnpE
 
The estimated coefficients are interpreted as the difference between the 
expected  price  under  different  exogenous  conditions  for  the  market 
participants before bidding takes place. Thus, we are analyzing how ex-ante 
known variations affect bidding in the short-run. We take a summer normal 
day as the basic environment in which bidding takes place. Tables 6 and 7 
present estimation results.
TABLE 6. Price model 
All
(785)
T1
(164)
T2
(64)
T3
(160)
T4
Replic. 
T1
(117)
T5
Replic. 
T2 after 
T4
(156)
T6
Replic. 
T3 after 
T1
(128)
Pv Winter 3.1 15.1 -42.9* 17.1 7.4 60.5*** 29.4***
Autumn -18.8** 8.3 -65.3** -2.9 7.1 --- 0.7
Summer -23.1** --- -66.1** --- 2.4 -12.2 ---
Spring --- 11.8 --- 21.3 --- 54.7*** 25.3**
Humid -26.7*** -13.8 -60.5*** -28.8* 0.5 -75.7*** -26**
Normal -10.6 -3.8 -19 0.2 -9.5 2.8 -2.1
Heatwave -9.3 --- -15 --- -6.63 --- 0.2
Coldwave --- 3.2 --- 17.5 --- 14.3 ---
Constant 337.3*** 339.3*** 332.6*** 312.2*** 315.1*** 310.7*** 281.7***
R2 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.03  0.01 0.21 0.09
Ps Winter 0.3 12.6 -42.7**
Autumn -20.7** 4.3 -46.7*
Summer -26.6*** --- -51.6**
Spring 2.6 ---
Humid -33.8*** -19.6 -55.8***
Normal -10.1 -5.3 -26.1
Heatwave -3.6 --- -19.1
Coldwave --- -1.5 ---
Constant 373.1*** 360.2*** 368.1***
R2 0.05 0.04 0.14
Pp Winter -2.4
Autumn -38.5***
Summer -41.7***
Spring ---
Humid -43.5***
Normal -12.1*
Heatwave -4.6
Coldwave ---
Constant 401.4***
R2 0.09
Pe Winter -3.6
Autumn -52.7***
Summer -55.5***
Humid -58.9***
Normal -15.5**
Heatwave -11.8
Coldwave ---
Constant 444.9***
R2 0.15
Number of observations for each treatment in parenthesis
• Significant at 10% level
• ** Significant at 5% level 
• *** Significant at 1% level
TABLE 7. Output model 
All
(785)
Valley output model
Winter 1547.4***
Autumn 2181.8***
Summer 1949.5***
Spring ---
Humid 1384.7***
Normal -1843.6***
Heatwave -475.4*
Coldwave ---
Constant 16486.5***
R2 0.31
Semivalley output model
Winter 2157***
Autumn 2347.4***
Summer 2368***
Spring ---
Humid 2247.9***
Normal -1040.4***
Heatwave -99.9
Coldwave ---
Constant 17166.2***
R2 0.25
Peak output model
Winter 2402.2***
Autumn 2799.1***
Summer 2636.7***
Spring ---
Humid 1989.4***
Normal -1732.3***
Heatwave -649.9*
Coldwave ---
Constant 18751***
R2 0.28
Extreme peak output model
Winter 1865.5***
Autumn 3405.5***
Summer 2990.7***
Spring ---
Humid 2324.5***
Normal -1913.1***
Heatwave -876.9**
Coldwave ---
Constant 20891.8***
R2 0.18
Number of observations for each treatment in parenthesis
• Significant at 10% level 
• ** Significant at 5% level 
• *** Significant at 1% level
Generally speaking, these estimates provide a rigorous test confirming 
the findings reported in the previous section. Furthermore, it is confirmed that 
our  experimental  setting  leads  previously  uninformed  subjects  to  actions 
which induce quite realistic market outcomes reflecting what would have been 
expected  to  happen  under  each  type  of  hour  and  each  specific  weather 
condition. An additional finding is that weather conditions have a stronger and 
statistically significant effect on output than prices. 
Our main conclusions are summarized in the following section.
4. Conclusions
Many  experts4 have  suggested  restructuring  the  Spanish  electricity 
market.  However,  textbook  industrial  organization  tells  us  little  on  the 
direction that such restructuring should follow. More sophisticated theoretical 
models systematically fail to address a number of central features of the real 
world. Furthermore, given the fact that historical data cannot be used to infer 
anything on the effects of a given structural change, empirical research would 
also fail to address the issue of what we should expect to observe following a 
change in the current structure of the market. 
We have reported here results from a series of experiments designed to 
address the effects of two alternative structural changes: vertical separation of 
corporations which are active on both sides  of  the market (generation and 
distribution) and independent entry of firms in the market of electric energy 
distribution.
Our  results  indicate  that  both  measures  would  lead  to  lower  prices, 
although  independent  entry  in  the  distribution  sector  would  yield  more 
significant price decreases. However, this is achieved at some cost, as it would 
increase  the  number  of  supply  interruptions.  Breaking  the  vertical  links 
between producers and distributors would lead to much more moderate price 
decreases, but this would be combined by a decrease in the number of supply 
interruptions.
Policy  makers  need  to  be  assisted  by  research  instruments  and 
methodologies which are appropriate for addressing some central features of 
the real world market under study, like demand fluctuations, production and 
demand-side  asymmetries  and  exercise  of  market  power  through  implicit 
recognition of strategic interdependences. Such objectives are more likely to 
4 A recent example is Vives (2006).
be achieved by appropriately designed and conducted laboratory experiments, 
of which this is a first attempt. 
APPENDIX: Software interface
Figure 10: Strategy-submission and feedback interface for a distributor.
Figure 11: Strategy-submission and feedback interface for a producer.
Figure 12: Feedback screen of a producer after the clearing price has been 
determined for a given period.
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